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This chapter critically considers two conceptions of sociological labor as they have recently been articulated in two competing visions for public sociology. I use the contrast between Ben Agger's and Michael Burawoy's recent professions of public sociology as a lens through which to critically understand the way in which the narratives produced by sociological labor govern the emergence of knowledge, which would be the basis of transformation.

As the title of this volume suggests, its unifying theme is the interdependence between nature, knowledge, and negation. How we aspire to achieve knowledge is intrinsically related to how we conceive of and exist in and with nature. In turn, how we think about and relate to nature is a function of the kinds of knowledge we pursue and the purposes we ascribe to the pursuit of knowledge. Yet, efforts related to facilitating and accumulating knowledge are intrinsically entwined with concrete socio-historical contexts, as are modes of existing in nature. Depending on the values and priorities that shape as well as represent social life in a particular society, its inhabitants are likely to regard nature as a dimension of reality that must be protected, nurtured, dominated, subjugated, or exploited. If most members of a given society would be fully cognizant of the perimeter circumscribing the relationships between that society and nature, the need for social theory should be limited, and the importance of critical theory close to negligible. As social philosophers and theorists of society have been trying to verbalize for more than two centuries, rigorous awareness of the character of prevailing society–nature (or culture–nature) links in modern societies has required focused and steady intellectual effort, as in societies of this type, the mode of relating to nature is not only highly dynamic, but also – under the aegis of industrialization – constructive and destructive at the same time. According to much of the history of social theory (its actual history, as opposed to the history of misinterpretations of social theories), from Hegel to Marx, to Weber, to the Frankfurt School theorists, to Foucault, Beck, and many others, how a society “sees” its relationship to nature is not likely to be conducive to grasping the real character of the relationship. Rather, how modern societies are contingent on a kind of conditioning that prevents human beings from facing the facts of what makes modern society possible shapes how humans perceive nature. Those perceptions are more likely than not integral features of modern society that are difficult to access without the help of social as well as critical theory, due to the kind of gravity they exert on human existence (Lemert, 2007). Put differently, without the willingness to “negate” the programming of individual as well as group consciousness that modern societies require to maintain stability and to function, “reality” will remain hopelessly elusive, and the ability to face facts a skill that is as difficult to sustain as the recognition of and commitment to a truly meaningful conduct of life. Without the practice of determined negation in Adorno's sense becoming integral to the life of humanity, socially compelling notions of “reality” and “meaning” will remain fleeting at best.¹